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Original scientific paper 
Risk protection has long been one of the main tasks of companies in a wide scope of business. From extensive range of risks the cyber-risks highlight as 
one of the most important. Cyber-risks are generated from hackers, malicious software, disgruntled employees, competitors, and many other sources both 
internal and external. Internal and external attacks on corporate assets and rapidly growing technology forced corporate management to conduct more 
appropriate awareness of the information security risks to information assets. The information security risk assessment, when performed correctly, can 
give corporate managers the information they need in order to understand and control the risks to their assets. The risks are in much more detail analysed 
in economic sectors, but in recent years there is increasing of risk assessment practice in the world of information technology. The model presented in this 
paper integrates the management and analysis of information risks and decision-making theory and thus creates a framework for the integrated 
management information system based on the technological risk assessment and Bayesian learning. The paper shows simulation and two case study 
scenarios in which is presented a potentially wide range of usage. 
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Metodologija odlučivanja temeljena na procjeni rizika informacijskih sustava i Bayesovom učenju 
 
Izvorni znanstveni članak 
Procjena rizika je tema kojom se bave kompanije iz širokog spektra djelatnosti i na temelju iste donose važne odluke za buduće poslovanje. Vrlo je važno 
strateški se opredijeliti i odabrati ključne odluke i unutar sustava upravljanja informacijskim sustavima. Različiti rizici koji proizlaze iz prijetnji i 
ranjivosti računalne opreme, osoblja koje je zaduženo za upravljanje tom opremom i sustavima za koje je informacijska tehnologija podrška, ugrožavaju 
temeljni cilj informacijskih sustava, da rade efektivno i efikasno. Procjena rizika informacijskih sustava temelji se na identificiranju prijetnji i ranjivosti, te 
određivanju vjerojatnosti njihovih ostvarenja, a time i vjerojatnost ostvarenja rizika. U trenutku kada je vjerojatnost događaja opisanog indikatorima koji 
ga mogu prouzročiti poznata, može se raspravljati i o matematičkim modelima pomoću kojih je moguće izračunati vjerojatnost događaja u budućnosti. 
Ako je pored procjena, poznata i statistička analiza u obliku zapisa stvarnih događaja, tada je statistički model moguće razviti u ozbiljan alat za podršku 
odlučivanju prilikom upravljanja informacijskim sustavima. U radu je prikazan model koji objedinjuje procjenu rizika informacijskih sustava i Bayesovu 
teoriju odlučivanja. 
 





An information asset includes all of the physical 
assets of a company, the staff, but also the processes and 
activities that can also be analysed in the same way. 
Decision-making process is based on two segments: 
mechanical decision is based on the calculation of the 
probability of favourable or adverse events, and in the 
case of uncertainty it is possible to seek a decision of 
man. Machine decision is based on indicators that need to 
be clearly defined and also scenarios describing edge 
cases need to be developed. Boundary cases are scenarios 
when it is not possible to bring a machine decision with a 
certain probability so that manual decisions are required. 
Both ways give feedback to the learning process.  
Mathematical algorithm in background is underlying 
the parameters based on probabilities while calculation 
determines the provided decisions. Risk assessment is 
included because its parameters are already based on 
probabilities, and as such explicitly indicate the 
probabilities of realization of events and the impact of 
these events on the information systems and business. 
Parameters underlying the decision-making process 
can be different and it is important to determine key 
performance indicators of effectiveness and efficiency in 
order to be higher. 
 
2 Risk assessment 
 
Risk analyses can be presented in a format which is 
almost independent from the application [1]. The most 
important step in the process of a risk assessment is to 
identify the context of the decision problem [1], i.e. the 
relation between the considered engineering system 
and/or activity and the analyst performing the assessment:  
• Who are the decision maker(s) and the parties with 
interests in the activity (e.g. society, client(s), state 
and organizations)?  
• Which matters might have a negative influence on the 
impact of the risk assessment and its results?  
• What might influence the manner in which the risk 
assessment is performed (e.g. political, legal, social, 
financial and cultural)? 
 
Risk is defined as a result of possible impact of 
threats to exposed vulnerability of information assets. 
Information assets are presented as values by using the 
properties of confidentiality, integrity, availability and 
other properties essential to the organization. The value of 
information assets is described as the impact level of 
these properties [2]. Financial value is not practical to use 
in this case because it is often not easy to determine how 
valuable information assets in cash are or described with a 
qualitative assessment. Information assets are necessary 
to be classified and divided into groups that need to be 
negotiated in the initial preparation of the risk assessment. 
It is convenient to observe and validate information 
assets in this way, because it is possible to manage wide 
range of assets. Also it is possible to achieve compliance 
with other processes in information system management 
cycle, e.g. Business Continuity Management, Incident 
Management.  
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Risk assessment is used in a number of situations 
with the general intention to indicate that important 
aspects of uncertainties, probabilities and/or frequencies 
and consequences have been considered in one way or the 
other. Decision theory provides a theoretical framework 












Figure 1 Decision theory based on Risk management 
 
Calculated risks are compared with the accepted risks 
initially stated in the risk acceptance criteria. If there is no 
possibility to accept the risks in accordance with the 
specified risk acceptance criteria, there are principally 
four different methods to proceed [5]:  
• Implementation of control: Risk mitigation is 
implemented by modification of the system such that 
the source of risk is removed. Risk reduction may be 
implemented by reduction of the consequences and/or 
the probability of occurrence – in practice risk 
reduction is normally performed by a physical 
modification of the considered system.  
• Risk transfer: Risk transfer may be performed by 
e.g. insurance or other financial arrangements where a 
third party takes over the risk.  
• Avoiding risk: Avoiding risk may be selected in 
cases where information resources or the processes 
are not necessarily required for the proper system 
operation. 
• Risk acceptance: If the risks do not comply with the 
risk acceptance criteria and other approaches for risk 
treatment are not effective than risk acceptance may 
be an option. 
 
Risk mitigation methods are representing the results 
of decision-making process.  
Decision support model presented in this article is 
based on events monitoring and regarding this it needs to 
be clear how every particular event is processed. 
Therefore, risk assessment is explained in the paper as a 
method of analysis of events which results are explicit 
probabilities. 
 
3 Basic probability rules and Bayesian theorem 
 
 In this model, a Bayesian theorem is used and 
methodology is developed by integrating the database of 
observed cases with expert experience and knowledge. 
All monitored parameters are considered trough 
likelihood of realization of event and thus are completely 
compatible with the Bayesian thesis [3]. 
An event E is defined as a subset of the sample space 
(all possible outcomes of a random quantity) . The 
failure event E of e.g. a structural element can be 
modelled by E={R ≤ S} where R is the strength and S is 
the load. The probability of failure is the probability 
Pf=P(E)=P{R ≤ S}. If a system is modelled by a number 
of failure events, failure of the system can be defined by a 
union or an intersection of the single failure events. 
a) If failure of one element gives failure of the system, 
then a union (series system) is used to model the 
system failure, E: 
 
𝐸 = ⋃ 𝐸𝑖𝑚𝑖=1 ,                                                                             (1) 
 
where Ei is the event that represents failure from i to m 
number of events.  
b) If failures of all elements are needed to obtain failure 
of the system, then an intersection (parallel system) is 
used to model the system failure, E: 
 
𝐸 = ⋂ 𝐸𝑖𝑚𝑖=1 .                                                              (2) 
 
Disjoint / mutually exclusive events are defined by 
𝐸1 ⋂𝐸2 = 0 where 0 is the impossible event. 
A complementary event E is denoted by 𝐸 ⋂𝐸� = 0 
and 𝐸⋃𝐸� = Ω. 
The so-called De Morgan’s laws related to 
complementary events are 
 
𝐸1 ⋂𝐸2 =𝐸1���⋃𝐸2������������� and 𝐸1 ⋃𝐸2 =𝐸1���⋂𝐸2�������������.                       (3) 
 
The conditional probability of an event E1 given another 





.                                                             (4) 
 
Event E1 is statistically independent of event E2 if 
𝑃(𝐸1|𝐸2) =  𝑃(𝐸1). 
From (4) we have 
 
𝑃(𝐸1 ⋂𝐸2) = 𝑃(𝐸1|𝐸2)𝑃(𝐸2) = 𝑃(𝐸2|𝐸1)𝑃(𝐸1).        (5) 
 
Therefore if E1 and E2 are statistically independent 
𝑃(𝐸1 ⋂𝐸2) = 𝑃(𝐸1)𝑃(𝐸2). 
Using the multiplication rule in (5) and considering 
mutually exclusive events E1, E2, E3,..., Em, the total 
probability theorem follows: 
 
𝑃(𝐴) =  𝑃(𝐴|𝐸1) 𝑃(𝐸1) + 𝑃(𝐴|𝐸2) 𝑃(𝐸2) + ⋯+
+ 𝑃(𝐴|𝐸𝑚) 𝑃(𝐸𝑚) = 
= 𝑃(𝐴⋂𝐸1) + 𝑃(𝐴⋂𝐸2) + ⋯+ 𝑃(𝐴⋂𝐸𝑚),         (6) 
 
where A is an event.  
From the multiplication rule in (5) it 
follows 𝑃(𝐴⋂𝐸𝑖) = 𝑃(𝐴|𝐸𝑖)𝑃(𝐸𝑖) = 𝑃(𝐸𝑖|𝐴)𝑃(𝐴). 
Using also the total probability theorem in (6) the so-









.    (7) 
 
 Bayesian theorem allows to determinate the 
probability of an event based on the probabilities of two 
or more recorded and independent events [4]. It is 
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possible to calculate the probability of confirmation of a 
set of initial hypotheses in case of realized and confirmed 
event A. In case of the application of this rule, it is 
necessary to know the probability 𝑃(𝐴) and 𝑃(𝐸𝑖), and it 
is also necessary to know statistical background used to 
determine the probability 𝑃(𝐴|𝐸𝑖). Formula is valid in the 
absence of mutual dependence between events A and 




Probability of an information assets property 
compromising within a computer system based on 
statistical data from the past and risk assessments by 
authorized persons. It is also possible to use objective data 
published by the authorities [7]. All initial data can be 
found within the historical database that contains the 
initial conditions for the operation of the system. 
Machine decision is based on the probability 
calculation of event that belongs to favourable or to 
adverse events. To be able to make decisions, it is 
necessary to define the limits of acceptability. In the 
example described in the paper the boundaries are defined 
by of the resulting probability of 90 % and all 
probabilities above this are characterized as unfavourable. 
New events and new combinations of parameters 
which potentially threaten the properties of information 
assets are recorded by the monitoring systems and stored 
into the real-time database. New parameters are stored in 
database and there they were assigned with initial 
probability values. Decisions on the initial values and the 
circumstances must be made and regarding this new 
events are classified. 
In the case of advanced mode usage, there is ability to 
define the level of uncertainty and the resulting range of 
probabilities. Within events where cannot be assessed 
enough confidence and thus categorized, it is necessary to 
determine the limit of probability values. Advanced 
system also allows additional control of machine 
decisions of favourable and unfavourable events. Such 
control must also be mechanical, but it must be based on 
detailed controls of the system parameters. This section is 
necessary to be further developed and indicators of 
suggesting a greater certainty of the correctness or 
incorrectness of decision need to be defined. 
 
3.2 Specification of previous events probabilities 
 
The historical database contains the probability of 
previous events. These probabilities need to be calculated 
on the basis of objective indicators. It is possible to use 
external sources of knowledge in case of the 
unavailability of proprietary data. The table shows one 
part of the database based on which simulation is 
conducted. The table contains the real data and the 
number of occurrences of threats and vulnerabilities in the 
event of information security was initially based on real 
data. After simulation these numbers have increased in 
line with the simulated events (Tab. 1). 
 




the parameter in 
adverse events 
Number of 








(0,85 ÷ 0,9) 
Inadvertent destruction of cables 2 20 0,560000000  
Inadvertent crushing equipment  21 0,377358491  Damage due to construction works  19 0,401146132 1 Termination of alternative power supply 1 17 0,428134557 1 
Voltage fluctuations 1 13 0,494699647  Termination of internal infrastructure 1 18 0,414201183  
 
The simulation is conducted by generating randomly 
selected parameters from the database and adding new 
parameters. In this way, the artificially generated event 
can be described by the familiar parameters, but also 
contains new information. 
After the simulation of events the knowledge base 
contained the following amount of data (Tab. 2). 
 
Table 2 Simulation statistics 
Adverse events 133 8,81 % 
Favourable events 1377 91,19 % 
Number of parameters in database 765  Uncertain events 7 0,46 % 
 
With every new event there is new mechanical 
decision based on the calculation of the probability of 
belonging to a set of favourable or set of adverse events. 
After deciding, the event is added to the total number of 
sets in which it is classified. In this way it increases the 
probability of making a valid machine decision. 
 
3.3 Calculation of the adverse events probability 
 
Adaptations of Bayesian theorem to system and 












NOK – Probability of adverse events 
nNOK – The number of occurrences in a set of adverse events 
nOK – Number of occurrences in a set of favourable events 
NNOK – The total number of adverse events 
NOK – The total number of favourable events. 
 
Both the relations of occurrence of events and the 
total number of the same event types are the probabilities 
of occurrences. In case of insufficient number of events in 
the database, it is possible to use the probabilities of the 
information system risk assessment [6].  
Tehnički vjesnik 21, 3(2014), 539-544                                                                                                                                                                                                             541 
Decision support based on the risk assessment of information systems and Bayesian learning                                                                       H. Očevčić, K. Nenadić, K. Šolić 
Risk assessment methodology compatible with the 
model below must be based on an assessment of 
probabilities of the realization of threats based on current 
vulnerabilities. A combination of threats and 
vulnerabilities makes risks and it is possible to calculate 
the probability of realization of adverse events, and the 







PNOK – Probability of adverse events 
pNOK – Probability of adverse event 
pOK – Probability of favourable event. 
 
The use of such a calculation of the probability of 
adverse events can replace the usage of assumptions in 
which the parameters of the insufficient number of entries 
are allocated with initial value of probability. 
 
4 Bayesian learning and decision theory 
 
Bayesian Decision Support System integrates the 
concept of uncertainty into the risk calculations. This is 
just a small sampling of the many risk assessment tools 
available. 
In typical decision problems encountered the 
information basis is often not very precise. In many 
situations it is necessary to use historical data. The 
available historical information is often not directly 
related to the problem considered but to a somewhat 
similar situation. Furthermore, an important part of a risk 
assessment is to evaluate the effect of additional 
information, risk reducing measures and/or changes of the 
considered problem. It is therefore necessary that the 
framework for the decision analysis can take these types 
of information into account and allow decisions to be 
updated based upon new information. This is possible if 




Figure 2 Bayesian learning 
 
 
Figure 3 Simulated parameters and machine decisions 
 
A fundamental principle in decision theory is that 
optimal decisions must be identified as those resulting in 
the highest expected utility [11]. In typical engineering 
applications the utility may be related to consequences in 
terms of costs, fatalities, environmental impact, etc.  
In these cases the optimal decisions are those 
resulting in the lowest expected costs, the lowest expected 
number of fatalities and so on. 
 
 
Figure 4 Complete Bayesian decision-making and learning flowchart 
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Knowledge database can be filled with the data 
processed by Bayesian algorithm. These data are resulting 
from real-time monitoring systems that are calculated 
from Bayesian networks. The greatest amount of new data 
comes from this part of the system. 
Updating the knowledge database filled with the 
manual decisions occurs only when using a more 
advanced system that includes the possibility of 
uncertainty machine decisions. 
Additional controls in the case of their existence, 
creating a link back to the knowledge database and 
making system up to date and learning functional (Fig. 2). 
The diagram shows the amount of parameters 
assigned to favourable and unfavourable events during the 
1500 event simulations randomly generated (Fig. 3). 
4.1 Developed model 
On the basis of the presented assumptions and 
theoretical background, a model of decision support is 
created. Model estimates the probability of threats and 
vulnerabilities and this implies to the risk of information 
systems management. 
Figure 4 shows an example of this model usage and 
learning functionality and additional uncertainty range. 
There is a noted link to risk assessment process which 
indicates to information between different processes 
exchanged [8]. 
4.2 Case study – Information system risk assessment, 
threats and vulnerabilities 
Simulation of decision support systems in the Spam 
filter case were implemented using some already 
classified spam messages. A text processing algorithm is 
developed to analyse incoming messages to separate 
words and the Bayesian model estimates probability of 
affiliation of a word to one of the groups: Spam or Ham 
(expression Ham is used according to common spam 
filtering syntax [13]). Actual e-mail messages from the 
Gmail service were used to learn the system (Fig. 5). 
Figure 5 Case study model using in Spam filtering 
Learning was based on already classified spam 
messages from the Trash mailbox and for Ham group 
from Inbox. Simulation model is selected in a manner in 
which the threats are spam messages, and the 
vulnerabilities are caused by improper handling of e-mail 
system. 
Table 3 Sample database in Spam filtering Case study 
Token Spam Frequency 
Ham 
Frequency Spamicity 
bit 4296 2292 0,344723798 
blood 383 53 0,669775576 
nigerian 140 2 0,862697231 
about 3301 2578 0,264373172 
account 585 563 0,225789499 
Spamicity is calculated probability of unwanted 
message, which is probability of adverse events, above 
defined (Tab. 3). 
4.3 Results and comparison 
Based on 60 messages taken from the e-mail mailbox, 
a comparison of classification was conducted. 59 
messages are equally classified, and one message is in our 
model marked as Spam, while Google spam filter marked 
the same message as correct. The message is manually 
analysed and classified as valid. Error rate in the 
simulation model is 1,6 % focusing on initial under-
developed database. Following a learning period of 
system increases accuracy and reduces the likelihood of 
errors.  
Some other analyses of Spam solutions showed very 
similar results. Spam precision is in paper [12] in range 
92,3 ÷ 100 %, but with a detailed combination of 
attributes to mark messages. In this paper, the primary 
task is not spam filtering, and therefore detailed analysis 
and additional attributes are not used. The aim is to use 
Bayesian learning and decision-making in practice case. 
A similar experiment was made in case of Intrusion 
Prevention/Detection System (IPS/IDS) in which the 
model is compared with Nessus (Tenable Network 
Security Inc.) and the results also indicate to the 
compliance of more than 90 %. In this case, there is no 
analysis of e-mail messages and words as parameters 
inside, but packets in network traffic. The picture is 
identical to that shown in Fig. 5, but in the case of 
IPS/IDS system there is no messages and Spam/Ham 
decisions, but IP packages and valid/not valid package. 
Also, there is option to use packages or IP addresses in 
manner of "black list" definitions. 
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Table 4 Sample database in Spam filtering Case study 







libvorbis 654 211 0,358941587 
openjdk-6 324 26 0,785265877 
libxml2 190 5 0,852468874 
xulrunner-1.9.2 1980 988 0,325871212 
dbus-glib 683 332 0,258749663 
Tab. 4 shows some of the characteristic values of this 
experiment. The parameters (token) in the table are the 
abbreviation of classified vulnerabilities in the Nessus 
application. Network of 1523 computers was scanned, 
servers were not included, and the database is loaded from 
Nessus. Fig. 6 shows the parameters in the experiment in 
the form of statistical data for the parameters used. 
Figure 6 Parameters overview in Intrusion Detection/Prevention case 
study 
Correspondence between classification of Nessus 
vulnerability and the decisions taken by Bayesian 
algorithm is 92 %. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, a decision support model of 
management information system is proposed. Model is 
based on continuous monitoring of threats and 
vulnerabilities which make information risks. Information 
risks managing system has a learning ability based on 
Bayesian theory.   
Simulation shows results compliant with 
expectations, and it was performed using the actual risk 
assessment data. Comparison of proposed model results 
and Google spam filter tool showed significantly better 
performance and accuracy. Also shown is the comparison 
with vulnerability testing system Nessus. All results are 
compared and show compliance in percentage greater 
than 90 %. 
The effectiveness and accuracy of the model are 
demonstrated through case studies, which indicate that the 
model is able to improve the accuracy and efficiency of 
security risk assessment for information systems. The 
main advantage of this model is its simplicity and 
flexibility, which make it competitive in the market of 
large and expensive systems. 
Mixture of various applications of the developed 
algorithm shows a wide range usability and adaptability. 
The disadvantages of this model are potentially long 
period of learning and the need of previous risk 
assessment data. Data from the risk assessment need to be 
structured as probabilities. Due to the large differences in 
risk assessment approaches we recommend to use the 
described methodology or similar rating of used 
parameters.  
Future work will focus on applying the proposed 
model to other practice situations, and building more 
sophisticated constraints into the model to enhance the 
performance of managed information systems. 
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